Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research.
Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research.
Ó 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The high level of voluntary cooperation in social interaction can be considered as one of the unique and defining human features. Teamwork and collective action have undeniably contributed greatly to the success of economy-based societies. But as cooperation often involves a reciprocal exchange of benefits in an interdependent fashion, it also provides an opportunity for exploitation. Some people may be tempted to free-ride on the cooperation of others, and hence profit from cooperative benefits without contributing. Such opportunistic behavior may easily undermine the effectiveness of cooperative action, and poses a challenge to evolutionary and economic explanations of cooperative behavior, especially in exchange situations where one has the choice between a self-interested strategy versus a strategy that benefits the whole group, but at a personal cost. Classic economic theory predicts that a Homo economicus, who compares the costs and benefits of different courses of action, will not cooperate given this dilemma. However, if no-one cooperates, everyone is worse off (Dawes & Messick, 2000) . Yet an abundance of field and experimental research has revealed that in all cultures people are willing to pay the cost of cooperation, even in anonymous situations where the probability of future repayment is zero (Henrich et al., 2005) .
This cooperation dilemma has sparked researchers in many scientific domains to pool their efforts in order to understand why costly prosocial behavior persists despite the high levels of uncertainty intrinsic to many social exchanges. The search for the roots of human cooperation has produced two mostly independent streams of research that have revealed two fundamentally different logics behind prosocial behavior, one claiming that cooperation is economically rational, the other that it is socially rational. Following economic rationality, cooperation is the product of natural selection acting on the individual (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006) . People are naturally motivated to pursue self-interest, but cooperate readily when self-interest coincides with collective interest. Hence this research stresses the importance of extrinsic incentives that align self-and collective interest prompting people to act prosocially to reap personal benefits from cooperative interactions (e.g., Bornstein, 2003; Kollock, 1998) .
Adherents of social rationality consider cooperation to be compatible with theories of group selection (e.g., Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson & Sober, 1994) . People are intrinsically motivated
